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PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW

(PMVFRL)


by Jonathan Cass, Esq.

 



APPENDIX

  1. Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance Act and Amendments
    (75 Pa.C.S.A. §1701, et seq.)


  2.  

  3. Opinion of Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998)


  4.  

  5. Administrative Regulations re: Automobile Insurance Medical Cost Containment (31 Pa. Code §§69.1-69.55)


 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                  

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

B. Purpose Of 1990 Amendments

C. Selected Definitions Under PMVFRL (75 Pa.C.S.A. §1702)

 

II. TORT OPTIONS

A. Selection of Options

B. Full Tort Option

C. Limited Tort Option

D. Application of Tort Options

E. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Tort Statute

 

III. FIRST PARTY BENEFITS

A. Mandatory Coverages

B. Optional Coverages

C. Ineligible/Excluded Claimants

D. “Occupancy” of Vehicle Defined

E. Priorities of First Party Coverage

F. Subrogation

G. Prohibition Against Stacking

H. Coordination of Benefits (Who Pays First)

I. Preclusion of Evidence

 

IV. PAYMENT OF FIRST PARTY BENEFITS

A. Generally

B. Peer Review

C. Attorney’s Fees & Limits on Contingency Fees

D. Medical Examinations

E. Statute of Limitations

 

V. UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

A. Eligibility to Collect UM/UIM Benefits

B. Required Coverage

C. Amount of Coverage

D. Priority of Recovery When Multiple Polices Are Applicable

E. Stacking

F. Coordination of Coverages

G. Set-Off of Amounts Recovered from Tortfeasor

H. “Consent To Settle” Clauses in UIM Endorsements

 

I. Exhaustion of Coverage Clauses in UIM Endorsements

J. Various Exclusions In UM/UIM Endorsements

K. Application of Limited Tort Selection to UM/UIM Claims

L. Workers’ Compensation and UM/UIM Benefits

M. Statute of Limitations

 

 

 

I)    INTRODUCTION

 

A)    Background

 

1)     In 1984, the legislature enacted the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“PMVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §1701, et seq.  The law substantially changed the Commonwealth's first No-Fault Law.  In 1990, the legislature enacted a series of amendments that again substantially changed the applicable statute.  The most significant change was the establishment of a “limited tort” option by which an insured gave up the right to sue for non-economic damages (i.e., pain and suffering) in exchange for a premium reduction, reduced first party benefits and the option to waive uninsured (UM) and underinsured (UIM) coverage, and stacking of UM and UIM coverage. The amendments became effective as of July 1, 1990.   The original act and the amendments Acts must be read together. (The complete text of the statute and amendments is set forth at Appendix “A”).

 

B)     Purpose Of 1990 Amendments

1)     Attempt to create a saving on premiums by giving the insurance consumer a choice:

 

(a)  an insured can give up his/her right to sue for non-economic loss in exchange for a 22% savings on premium.  This option is keyed to "private passenger motor vehicles" which excludes rental and commercial vehicles.

(b)  even if the insured does not give up the right to sue for non-economic loss, he/she is to save 10%.

(c)  the savings are based on rates in effect as of 12/1/89.

 

 

C)    Selected Definitions Under PMVFRL (75 Pa.C.S.A. §1702)

1)     “Financial responsibility”

 

(a)  the ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of $15,000 because of the injury to one person in any one accident, in the amount of $30,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident and in the amount of $5,000 because of damage to property of others in any one accident.

 

2)     “Injury”

(a)  accidentally sustained bodily harm to an individual and that individual’s illness, disease or death resulting therefrom.

 

3)     “Insured”

(a)  Any of the following:

(1)an individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance;

(a)an individual listed only in the “named drivers” section of the policy does not qualify as a “named insured.” Stump v. State Farm, 564 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 1989)

(2)if residing in the household of the named insured:

(a)a spouse or other relative of the named insured

(b)a minor in the custody of either the named insured or a relative of the named insured;

 

4)     "Necessary medical treatment and rehabilitative services"

(a)  treatment, accommodations, products or services which are determined to be necessary by a licensed health care provider unless they shall have been found or determined to be unnecessary by a State‑approved Peer Review Organization (PRO).

 

5)     “Non-economic loss”

(a)  pain and suffering and other non-monetary detriment.

 

6)     “Private passenger motor vehicle”

(a)  a four‑wheel motor vehicle, except recreational vehicles not intended for highway use, which is insured by a natural person and:

(1)is a passenger car neither used as a public or livery conveyance nor rented to others; or

(2)has a gross weight not exceeding 9,000 pounds and is not principally used for commercial purposes other than farming.

(b)  the term does not include any motor vehicle insured exclusively under a policy covering garage, automobile sales agency repair shop, service station or public parking place operation hazards.

 

7)     “Serious injury”

(a)  a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

 

8)     “Underinsured motor vehicle” (UIM)

(a)  a motor vehicle for which the limits of available liability insurance and self‑insurance are insufficient to pay losses and damages.

 

9)     "Uninsured motor vehicle" (UM)

(a)  Any of the following:

(1)a motor vehicle for which there is no liability insurance or self‑ insurance applicable at the time of the accident;

(2)a motor vehicle for which the insurance company denies coverage or the insurance company is or becomes involved in insolvency proceedings in any jurisdiction;

(3)an unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in injury provided the accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority and the claimant notifies his insurer within 30 days, or as soon as practicable thereafter, that the claimant or his legal representative has a legal action arising out of the accident.

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II)    TORT OPTIONS

 

A)     Selection of Options

1)     Two Tort Options- for all policies issued or renewed on or after July 1, 1990, insurers must advise each named insured of the two tort options available under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“PMVFRL”).  75 Pa.C.S.A.  §1705(a)(1)

 

2)     Selection- any named insured may make the tort election.  An election binds all other named insureds and insureds.  §1705(a)(2)

(a)  once the named insured makes the tort election in writing, all named insureds and all insureds are barred from claiming liability based on being inadequately informed. §1705(a)(2)

 

B)    Full Tort Option

1)     Generally- a claimant who is deemed “full tort” can seek recovery for all unreimbursed economic and non-economic (pain and suffering) losses arising out of an automobile accident.  §1705(c)

(a)  NJ Exception- if an accident occurs in NJ and claimant’s PMVFRL insurer does business in NJ, then the NJ “verbal threshold” (similar to  PA’s “limited tort threshold”) applies, regardless of any full tort selection on the PMVFRL policy.  Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116 (3d. Cir. 1993); Whitaker v. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341 (1997)

2)     Individual is considered full tort if:

(a)  considered an insured under a policy of insurance for which the full tort option has been selected; or

 

(b)  is not the owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle. §1705(b)(3)

 

C)    Limited Tort Option

1)     Generally– unless a claimant falls within one or more of seven exceptions, a claimant may seek recovery only for unreimbursed economic loss arising out of an automobile accident.  §1705(d)

2)     Exceptions

(a)  if the tortfeasor is a convicted or ARD drunk driver;   §1705(d)(1)(i)

(b)  if the tortfeasor is operating a motor vehicle registered out-of-state;   §1705(d)(1)(ii)

(c)  if the tortfeasor intended to injure himself or another;   §1705(d)(1)(iii)

(d)  if the tortfeasor is uninsured; §1705(d)(1)(iv)

 

NOTE: the above four exceptions do not apply to any resulting UM/UIM claim. Rump v. Aetna Casualty, 678 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 1996); §1731(d)

 

(e)  if recovery is sought against a person in the business of designing, manufacturing, repairing, servicing, or maintaining vehicles for acts or omissions arising of out such a business, other than a defect in a motor vehicle which is operated by such business; §1705(d)(2)

(f)   if claimant is an occupant of a motor vehicle other than a private passenger motor vehicle;  §1705(d)(3)

(g)  if claimant suffers a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.   §1705(d)

 

3)     Role of Fact Finder

(a)  Whether claimant has sustained a “serious injury” is determined in all but the clearest cases by the fact finder (i.e. the jury).  Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998) (A copy of the Washington opinion is attached as Appendix “B”).

(b)  The fact finder is to evaluate two issues:

(1)what body function, if any, was impaired; and

(2)was the impairment of the body function serious?

(c)  the focus of this inquiry is not on the injuries but rather on how the injuries affected a particular body function (a topic generally requiring medical evidence).  In determining whether an impairment is serious, the fact finder should consider:

(1)the extent of the impairment;

(2)the length of time the impairment lasted;

(3)the treatment required to correct the impairment; and

(4)“any other relevant factors.”

(d)  the impairment need not be permanent to be “serious.”

 

4)     Effect of Washington on Summary Judgement

(a)  summary judgment for defendants is still possible and was affirmed in Washington, supra, but will only be granted in the “clearest cases.”

(b)  summary judgment affirmed where there had been no treatment for five year period prior to the motion and no absence from employment (although claimant had changed occupations from plumber to electrician).  McGee v. Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2000)

 

5)     Specific Types of Injuries

(a)  soft tissue injuries can constitute a “serious injury.” Chanthavong v. Tran, 682 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(b)  mental disorders or psychiatric problems can constitute a “serious injury” with proper proof.  Hames v. PHA, 696 A.2d 880 (Pa. Commw. 1997)

(c)  facial laceration visible three and one-half years after accident, and unanimous medical expert opinion that scarring most likely permanent considered serious permanent disfigurement.  Gemmell v. Barrett, 35 Pa. D. & C.4th 38 (Indiana Co. 1997)

(d)  when determining whether serious permanent disfigurement exists, focus is on: (1) how noticeable is the scarring after there has been a period of healing as opposed to what the injury may have looked like shortly after the accident; (2) is there medical evidence that opines that the scarring is permanent.  Walsh v. Phillips, 38 Pa. D. & C.4th 178 (Bucks Co. 1997)

 

6)     Review of Post-Washington Case Law

(a)  summary judgment granted by trial court prior to Washington, supra, reversed where evidence showed that plaintiff had missed six weeks of work, sustained herniated disc with lumbar radiculopathy, continued to have pain and numbness and gave up some hobbies and limited others.  Hellings v. Bowman, 744 A.2d 274 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(b)  summary judgment granted where: plaintiff diagnosed with cervical strain and sprain, trapezius myofascitis, post traumatic headaches, contusion to finger and knee and underwent physical therapy, arthroscopic knee surgery.  Six (6) months post-accident condition greatly improved and no longer taking pain medication, but still had pain in knee after walking long periods of time and at night.   Piwonski v. Choe, 38 Pa. D. & C.4th 449 (Bucks Co. 1999) summary judgment granted where: missed four weeks of work, one year post-accident plaintiff still complaining of ringing in ears at least once a week, headaches as least three times per week, back pain from bulging disc requiring four months of physical therapy.  Plaintiff still able to exercise at gym three times a week. Atkinson v. Snyder, 41 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 (Bucks Co. 1999)

(c)  summary judgment granted where accident-related injuries necessitated only limited medical treatment and caused plaintiff to miss only a few days of work.  Sekol v. Albrecht, 51 Pa. D. & C.4th 235 (Lackawanna Co. 2001)

(d)  no summary judgment where plaintiff diagnosed with bulging disc and three years after accident, plaintiff still unable to walk more than a block at a time, cannot lift heavy objects and had to reduce employment status from full time to part time. Furman v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. 1998)

(e)  summary judgment reversed where plaintiff diagnosed with herniated disc, lumbar radiculopathy, underwent physical therapy, missed six months of work, had lingering numbness, continued pain, could no longer ride in car without pain and had some hobbies eliminated and others limited. Hellings v. Bowman, 744 A.2d 274 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(f)   no summary judgment: plaintiff was taken to the emergency room after the accident, had been treated with physical therapy following the accident,  continued to complain of soreness in her neck, back and knee, was only able to work a limited schedule due to her injuries. McHale v. Wuagon, 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 444 (Lackawanna Co. 2000)

 

7)     Application to Pedestrians

(a)  Trial courts have split on issue of whether a pedestrian is bound by limited tort election of a family member.

(1)not bound by limited tort selection:

(a)a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle was not bound by his father’s selection of the limited tort option despite the fact that the pedestrian was an insured under his father’s policy.  Andreyo v. Radle, PICS Case No. 02-0691(Daupin County, April 1, 2002)

(2)bound by limited tort selection

(a)limited tort election of plaintiff’s husband applied to pedestrian-wife. Eckler v. Watson, No. 1999-2074 C.P. (Mercer County, April 11, 2001)

(b)claimant struck by a vehicle while directing traffic at a construction site was bound by election of limited tort option.  Spearman v. Rabe, 146 P.L.J. 111 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1998; affirmed 724 A.2d 969 (Pa. Super. 1998)

 

D)     Application of Tort Options

1)     Deemed Full Tort– a person who neither owns a currently registered private passenger  motor vehicle nor qualifies as an insured under a private passenger motor vehicle is deemed to have “full tort” rights.  §1705(b)(3)

 

2)     Deemed Limited Tort- owner of uninsured vehicle: an owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle without financial responsibility (i.e, without the minimum insurance coverage required under the PMVFRL) is deemed to have selected the “limited tort” option. §1705(a)(3)

(a)  the “deemed limited tort” status extends to all relatives resident in the household.  Hames v. PHA, 696 A.2d 880 (Pa. Commw. 1997)

(1)But see: Ickes v. Burkes, 713 A.2d 653 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that the wife who was a passenger in her husband’s automobile which was registered but not insured not deemed limited tort).

(b)  But, if the owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle qualified for full tort status as an “insured” under a policy and if the owner is not occupying the uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident, the owner is considered full tort.  Berger v. Rinaldi, 651 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. 1994)

 

3)     Priority When Multiple Tort Elections- an insured under a policy is bound by the tort election applicable to the policy unless that individual is a named insured on another policy.  If a named insured on another policy, the tort election on the named insured policy will control.  §1705(b)(2), Hobbs v. Ryce, 769 A.2d 469 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(a)  if a person qualifies as an insured under two or more policies with conflicting tort option elections, the tort election on the policy covering the motor vehicle involved in the accident controls.  If no vehicle insured under the conflicting policies is involved in the accident, the “full tort” option applies.  §1705(b)(2)

 

4)     Effect of Election– once a named insured has elected a tort option, that option remains in effect until the insurer received a properly executed option form changing the election.  §1705(b)(1)

 

 

E)    Statute of Limitations Applicable to Tort Statute

1)     the statute of limitations on claims for non-economic damages for a limited tort claimant does not start to run until the claimant knows or has reason to know that any injuries from the accident constitute a “serious injury.”  Walls v. Scheckler, 700 A.2d 532 (Pa. Super. 1997)

 

 

BACK TO TOP


III)    FIRST PARTY BENEFITS

A)     Mandatory Coverages

1)     Generally- the coverage requirements of the PMVFRL apply to liability policies covering motor vehicles (except certain recreational vehicles and motorcycle-type vehicles) registered and operated in the Commonwealth.

2)     $5,000.00 in required  medical benefits.

(a)  for payment of reasonable and necessary medical treatment without limitation as to time, provided that within 18 months from the accident it is ascertainable with reasonable medical probability that further expenses might. §§1711(a), 1712(1)

3)     no required work loss benefits. §1711(a)

 

B)    Optional Coverages

1)     the carrier must offer at least the following optional coverages for purchase:

(a)  Additional medical benefits up to $100,000.00. §1715(a)(1)

(b)  Extraordinary medical benefits from $100,000.00 to $1,100,000.00  which may be offered in increments of $100,000. §1715(a)(1.1)

(1)except for the first 18 months after an accident (when no annual limit applies), this coverage is subject to a $50,000 per year cap. §§1712(b), 1715(a)(1.1), 1715(d)

(c)  Income loss benefits up to $50,000 ($2,500.00 per month maximum). §§1715(a)(2), 1712(2)

(1)80% of actual loss of gross income

(2)reasonable expenses incurred to hire replacements to peform self-employment services

(3)reasonable expenses incurred for “special help” enabling the claimant to work.

(4)limitations on income loss benefits

(a)does not cover post-mortem work loss;

(b)a 5 day deductible applies to any work loss claim

(5)relevant case law

 

(a)lack of employment at the time of the accident does not bar recovery.  “Actual loss of gross income” can be established by showing that the claimant would have worked and earned income but for the accident. Persik v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 930 (Pa. Super. 1989)

(b)where claimant has received workers’ compensation benefits, the PMVFRL wage benefit is 80% of the wage loss after it has been reduced by the workers’ compensation payment. Danko v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 630 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. 1993)

(c)“actual loss of gross income” is not reduced by sick pay or social security benefits received by a claimant. Panichelli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 930 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(d)the definition of “month” when calculating the maximum benefit for wage loss means the period of time beginning with a date in one calender month and ending with the corresponding date in the next calender month (i.e., June 15 to July 15).  Tyler v. Motorists Mutual, 779 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(d)  Accidental death benefits to at least $25,000.00  §1715(a)(3)

(1)death must occur within 24 months of accident

(2)benefits is payable to personal representative of estate

(e)  Funeral benefits up to $2,500.00 provided that death due to accident occurs within 24 months of the accident. §§1715(a)(4), 1712(4)

(f)   Combined benefit of $177,500.00 (with individual limits of $25,000 on any accidental death benefit and $2,500 in funeral benefits) subject to a 3 year limitation period.

(1)total benefits limited to:

(a)aggregate limit shown on declaration sheet, or;

(b)three years from date of accident; whichever occurs first. §1715(a)(5)

 

C)    Ineligible/Excluded Claimants

1)     Individuals ineligible to receive first party benefits:

(